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Abstract—Artificial intelligence (AI) has been a topic of major
research for many years. Especially, with the emergence of deep
neural network (DNN), these studies have been tremendously
successful. Today machines are capable of making faster, more
accurate decision than human. Thanks to the great development
of machine learning (ML) techniques, ML have been used many
different fields such as education, medicine, malware detection,
autonomous car etc. In spite of having this degree of interest
and much successful research, ML models are still vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. Attackers can manipulate clean data in
order to fool the ML classifiers to achieve their desire target.
For instance; a benign sample can be modified as a malicious
sample or a malicious one can be altered as benign while this
modification can not be recognized by human observer. This can
lead to many financial losses, or serious injuries, even deaths.
The motivation behind this paper is that we emphasize this
issue and want to raise awareness. Therefore, the security gap
of mammographic image classifier against adversarial attack is
demonstrated. We use mamographic images to train our model
then evaluate our model performance in terms of accuracy. Later
on, we poison original dataset and generate adversarial samples
that missclassified by the model. We then using structural
similarity index (SSIM) analyze similarity between clean images
and adversarial images. Finally, we show how successful we are
to misuse by using different poisoning factors.
Index Terms—DNN, adversarial ML, security and Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cancer is caused by uncontrolled reproduction of some cells
in the body, with breast cancer being one of the most prevalent
cancer types that occurs among women. Cells reproduce in
order for the body to regenerate and heal, but mutations can
cause cells to overproduce and create tumors.
The tumors can be benign or malignant. Benign tumors are
considered harmless and appear normal and do not invade the
other tissues nearby. On the other hand, malignant tumors are
the cancerous and spread other parts of the body.
Breast cancer usually starts to occur in the milk ducts most
of the time and commonly in the lobules of the breast [1].
Though it is unlikely males also get breast cancer. The reason
of the cancer might vary, and usually there is more than
one factor including old age, excessive alcohol and tobacco
consumption or simply genetic predisposition.
For treatment, early identification is key, otherwise the
tumor can lead to loss of the breast for the person. One of
the best methods to recognize the the breast cancer is to use
mammography. However, poor quality can result in a misdi-
agnosis. In order to decrease the occurrence of misdiagnosis,
ML models have been in the usage in the field of computer
science to identify cancerous cells on mammographic images
and get more accurate results.
Along with developing ML, ML has become significant
separating images of cancerous cell from images of normal
cells. Recently, there have been much successful research
to diagnose and classify breast cancer using DNNs. Due to
the high performance and effective computation, DNNs are
greatly preferred regarding classification of mammographic
images; according to a research, convolutional neural network
(CNN),is a type of DNN, effectively classifies malicious and
benign samples on mammogram images [2], [3]. Although
CNN is widely used for detection of cancereous cell, it
relies on data-driven approaches and the performance of the
classifier based on data. Therefore, the user should think
carefully and consider these simple questions.
"Is the mammographic image classifier vulnerable to adver-
sarial data manipulation?
Is it easy to find adversarial way to fool mammographic
image classifier?"
Unfortunately, the answer of both questions are yes. In that
case, how can the robustness of the breast cancer classifier
model be trusted if data can be manipulated easily? In this
paper, the issue is addressed by showing different case studies
and analyze a potential solution regarding this problem.
A. Contributions
Recent research has demonstrated that CNNs perform
poorly on altered images generated by injecting subtle per-
turbation to original image. These kind of crafted images
may change decision of CNN on mammographic image. It
leads to a misclassification of notably automated breast cancer
detection over given adversarial mammographic image. This
situation may cause a misdiagnosis of cancer to healthy person
and vice versa. It may result in breast loss or financial
and psychological consequences. This paper contains the
following constructive contributions to highlight this security
weakness and heighten awareness of physicians when they
give a diagnosis of cancer:
• We highlight and assess the security vulnerability of
CNN widely used in the diagnosis of breast cancer.
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2• We implement an efficient adversarial attack on mammo-
graphic images in order to fool the mammographic image
classifier. To the best of our knowledge, adversarial attack
applied on mamograpgic image classifier is the first time.
• We analyze the comparison between original and crafted
mamograpgic images using SSIM and analyze the how
original image change based on different perturbation
coefficient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the necessary
background of CNN was reviewed in Section II. We present
the proposed attack strategy on mammographic image in
Section III. We implement of attack on CNN models in
Section IV. The evaluation results of our adversarial attack are
presented in Section V. We look into the literature review in
the context of our work in Section VI. Ultimately, we finalize
the paper in section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly go through learning process of
DNNs along with a deep learning approach using CNN on
the mammographic image.
A. Learning Process
DNNs like humans, have learning process with experience.
Available data is the experience of DNNs. DNNs try to
capture distribution of training data which helps to determine
boundary decisions between the normal and the cancerous
images. Built model then predicts whether the unlabelled
image is cancerous or normal.
DNN is supervised learning process meaning that a paired
training data X and Y is given. Here X represents the
mammographic image and Y represents the ground-truth label
as cancer or normal. The aim of the model is to find a function
f(X) that fits the map perfectly from X to Y. Model takes each
mammographic image and their corresponding label data and
learns the behaviour of model by minimizing error.
B. Deep Learning Approach Using CNN on Mammographic
Image
CNN is a special type of deep neural network which is
widely used for image classification. As DNN, CNN com-
prises of input, output and hidden layers. However, hidden
layer is comprised of different parts knowns as convolution,
pooling and fully connected, different from the DNN. An
example of CNN architecture with two phase is epicted in
Figure 1. It is taken in [4].
Convolutional layer and pooling layer is used for feature
selection of the mamographic image, and these feature are
connected with each other in the fully connected layer.
Convolutional layer: In this layer, filter matrix which is
special matrix and its size depend on architecture model is
applied over mammographic image. Convolution operation is
a linear operation, so to make it non-linear, activation function
is applied following convolution operation. This is because
mostly complex problems are nonlinear and can be solved by
nonlinear functions.
Figure 1: CNN Architecture with Two Phase.
Pooling Layer: Pooling layer is a subsampling process.
It is mostly used following convolutional process and there
is no learning part in this layer. There are different types
of pooling layers such as max pooling, mean pooling, sum
pooling etc. Most often, max pooling is used because of its
high performance. In the maximum pooling, the maximum
pooling function takes group of pixel values as input and
chooses the biggest one of this group as output.
Fully connected layer: CNN is completed with this layer. In
this layer, all nodes are connected and are used with softmax
or sigmoid function in order to predict probabilities of each
output through learning process.
C. Structural Similarity Index (SSIM)
Structural similarity Index is used a lot to compare different
images in terms of similarity. Prior to the SSIM, mean
square error was preferred by researchers, yet because of its
limited functionality, a new image quality assessment was
needed. Wang et al. in [5] brought a new solution to evaluate
image quality assessment in terms of luminance, contrast, and
structure.
Luminance is a measure that indicates how much light
passes through, along with what is reflected or spread from
a certain region at a certain time [6]. However, the simple
definition of contrast is differences between lowest and highest
pixel density in a image [7]. In addition, structure is another
metric used to distinguish images from each other. It is used
to tell objects apart. If a image is considered, then it assesses
in terms of edges, corners, sub-regions etc of the image.
Multiplicative function of these three features give a struc-
tural similarity index value. If the SSIM value is high, it means
that these two images are very similar. If it is low when two
images are compared, it is interpreted as different images.
III. ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we introduce our attack model based on
CNN which is inspired in [8] in order to generate adversarial
mammographic image samples that fool the mamograpgic
image classifier.
ML models are data driven approach and aim to minimize
cost function using the gradient descent algorithm. The idea
behind this attack is to find a adversarial direction and all
pxel values change based on that direction in an attempt
to lead to a misclassification. Adding imperceptibly small
computed noise on the same direction of cost function is able
to maximize cost function instead of minimize it. To put it
3simply, attackers use gradient cost function with respect to
input data and add small amount of perturbation to maximize
the cost. By doing this way, attackers craft adversarial samples
which are assigned to the incorrect labels. We can explain the
mathematical definition of our algorithm below.
Let M be our mammograpgic image classifier model. x is a
real mammographic image and y is the corresponding ground-
truth output label (cancer or normal) of given the image. C(
M,x,y) is the cost function used to train model,  is the
penetration coefficient, xˆ is the adversarial mammographic
image is crafted by the adversarial and yˆ is the prediction
of the model given a adversarial image (xˆ) as an input.
objective max c(M, xˆ, y) (1)
subject to xˆ = x+ δx (2)
|x|d ≤  ∗ |x| (3)
in (3) represents dimensionality of mammographic image
data is allowed to be altered. We set d is infnity as proposed
in [8]. It means that it is allowed to add perturbation on any
dimension of the original mammograpgic images.
In addition, δx in (2) denotes perturbation added to the orig-
inal mamographic images. The magnitude of this perturbation
should be equal or less than  as constrained in (3) where 
controls perturbation amount. The aim is to maximize error
in (1).
δx is computed as follows:
δx =  ∗ sign(∇x c(M,x, y)) (4)
where sign (∇x c(M,x,y) )) is the direction of minimizing
cost function of the model and  controls the penetration
magnitude in (3).
Therefore, cost function of adversarial mammographic im-
ages is c(M, xˆ, y) and y 6= yˆ must be true if this attack is
succeed.
Figure 2: Adversarial Attack Visualization.
To visualize, we draw our attack scenario in Figure 2 with
triangulars representing cancer cells and circles representing
normal cells. A normal cell which is close to the boundary
decision is predicted truly by the CNN model. After adding
subtle perturbation on test phase, the same model predicts
the cancer cell incorrectly. Because of the limited feature
precision, small changes of pixel value are not able to be
realized by human eyes. However, these changes may cause
the activation function to grow exponentially and fool the
breast cancer classifier.
Range of the  value is between 0 and 1. Rising  value
increases the probability of xˆ being misclassified by the model
M. On the other hand, increasing  value leads to adversarial
samples to be detected by human eyes. There is a trade-off
between increasing the probablity an attack will be successful
and being recognizable by human. In Evaluation Section, we
also evaluate the how much the original images are modified
through adversarial attacks using a structural similarity index.
IV. MATERIAL AND METHOD
A. Data Processing
The University of South Florid provides mammographic im-
age dataset in order for researchers to develop new techniques
for early diagnosis of breast cancer [9]. The database includes
roughly 2500 samples. However, we could use 100 od them
for our work because of limitations. Each sample has ground-
truth label as normal or cancer.
Collection of data from dataset is challenging since the
dataset has different files, each file includes different studies,
and the image format is ’GIF’. After data has been collected
from different files, each image has been converted ’JPG’
format manually. Furthermore, each image size is different.
Prior to images have been used as input of our model, with
the dimensions of the images being set up 256 X 256.
B. Implementation of Model
We encode our implementation in Python using Tensorflow
[10] in ourder build our model based on a CNN. Number of
convolution layers, pooling layers, fully connected layers and
iterations mainly depends on the CNN’s architecture and the
dataset itself to find optimum parameters. Therefore, we try
different architectures until we reach an optimum solution. We
train our model with optimum accuracy performance including
2 different convolution layers, each with a 5 X 5 kernel
size, two different max pool layers and two different fully
connected layers, with 180 X 50 and 50 X 2 sizes respectively.
Afterwards, we apply FGSM attacks to our trained model
with different  values. We produce adversarial samples for
each  value so as to deceive victim model and we monitor
how its accuracy changes based on different  values. We
set  value to 0 as well because it represents the model
performance on the original test set. In addition, we monitor
how original image changes with different  values using
SSIM technique and try to figure out which epsilon value can
be more successful without being recognizable by people.
V. EVALUATION
We use 100 mammographic images taken from ’Digital
Database for Screening Mammography’ (DDSM) database
4released by the University of South Florida. 70 of the images
are obtained from a healthy person and rest of them are taken
from cancerous patient. We divide our database in two parts.
90 images are used to train our model and the 10 remaining
images are used to test accuracy of our model.
There are some samples of cancer images in Figure 3 and
normal images in Figure 4. We evaluate our attack success by
observing decreasing accuracy of the CNN model. Adversarial
samples which we generate mislead the model into making
incorrect decision.
Using FGSM attack algorithm, we craft attack samples for
both cancer and normal images. Some are depicted in Figure
5 and in Figure 6 based on different epsilon values.
We sometimes set epsilon values high intentionally to
demonstrate maximum damage to victim model and to show
how the penetrated image is easily detected by observer
with high epsilon values. We modify epsilon values with
small values and monitor how much adversarial samples
impair performance of our model without being recognizable.
Adversarial samples are produced with small epsilon values
In Figure 7 and in Figure 8.
When we train our model, the model’s accuracy reach to 70
with clean image. The reason of the higher performance value
is not found is because being trained with a small dataset. It
is believed that this number would be higher if the model
was trained with a bigger dataset. In this study, we emphasize
how a CNN classifier is vulnerable against adversarial attack
rather than enhance the model’s performance. Graphics show
how the model’s performance is compromised with different
penetration coeficients in Figure 9 and in Figure 10.
Also, we observe how penetrated images are degenerated by
different epsilon values using SSIM. Graphics illustrate these
differences in Figure 11 and in Figure 12.
VI. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks against DNN classifiers were discussed
previously by different researchers. in this research, we carry
out a FGSM attack against a mammographic image classifier
based on CNN to compromise its performance first time.
Szegedy et al. [11] showed various of intriguing attributes
of neural networks and relevant models. Malicious samples
which they produced were very close to original examples
that the human eye perceives as identical. They performed
on ImageNet dataset and their adversarial examples were
misclassified by several classifiers with different architec-
tures. Goodfellow et al. [8] introduced FGSM attack for
the first time. They applied their attack on MNIST dataset
[12] including handwritten digits from 0 to 9 and achieved
to mislead classifiers. They attempted to maximize error by
adding optimum noise.
Papernot et al. [13] address an issue as well and applied
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA). They attempted
to find most important pixel features which lead to signif-
icant changes to the output by modifying in a way that is
imperceptible. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [14] also discussed
adversarial attack . They identified the decision boundary
of deep learning classifier based on inputs and tried to find
closest distance to the decision boundary pixels of the original
input which were manipulated to misguide the model. They
implemented adversarial attacks against only deep learning
classifiers. Therefore, they called it a deepfool attack. Then,
they improved their deepfool adversarial attack and they
formulated to find universal penetration vector in [15].
Nguyen et al. [16] designed a different adversarial attack
using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) in which they managed
to fabricate images to misclassify a high confidence classifier
in an optimum way. Carlini and Wagner [17] created a novel
adversarial attack called a cws attack as the initial letter of
their names . They claimed that their attack type could evade
all existing adversarial detection defenses at this time when
they published their works.
Su et al. [?] aproached adversarial attacks from a different
point of view and managed to produce adversarial samples by
altering one pixel value of original image. Rozsa et al. [18]
generated great numbers of adversarial attack samples from
one original image by transformation or rotation of that image.
Zhao et al. [19] generated adversarial samples synthetically
using generative adversarial network (GAN) instead of trans-
formation or rotation of an original image. In GAN concept,
there are two different classifiers named discriminator and
generator. Generator first creates a random noise and tries to
capture data distribution of the original image. Discriminator
takes original images and images fabricated by generator as
input and distinguishes between them and give feedback to
generator. Generator always tries to fabricate better images
which can not be distinguishable by discriminator. At one
point generator’s synthetic images can not be recognized by
discriminator. Thus, new samples can be created. 1
VII. CONCLUSION
NN is used a lot for breast cancer detection and classifi-
cation with high accuracy. In this research, we discuss the
security and vulnerability of CNNs. We present an attack
algorithm to exploit the security gap of CNNs in breast
cancer classification and raise awareness of radiologists and
doctors. The adversarial strategy is viable without changing
the architecture of the algorithm, however, in order to solely
modify input data. We evaluate our adversarial attack with
different penetration coefficients and show these changes in a
mathematical way using structural similarity index. Hopefully,
our work will promote further research to increase the robust-
ness of CNN in breast cancer classification. Although there
have been much research regarding defense strategy against
adversarial attacks, countermeasures for detection of malicious
samples have not been well-studied and are still a significant
problem. Currently, we are working to find adapted threshold
value to differentiate real image from fake one. In this way,
intrusion samples can be detected automatically.
REFERENCES
[1] Breast cancer. [Online]. Available: https://ww5.komen.org/
BreastCancer/
1Other works have studied the problem [20]–[32]
5Figure 3: Cancer Images. Figure 4: Normal Images.
Figure 5: Adversarial Samples for Cancer Images with High
Epsilon Values.
Figure 6: Adversarial Samples for Normal Images with High
Epsilon Values.
Figure 7: Adversarial Samples for Cancer Images with Small
Epsilon Values.
Figure 8: Adversarial Samples for Normal Images with Small
Epsilon Values.
Figure 9: Accuracy vs. Penetration Coefficient with High
Epsilon Values.
Figure 10: Accuracy vs. Penetration Coefficient with Small
Epsilon Values.
6Figure 11: Structural Similarity Index vs. Penetration Coef-
ficient with High Epsilon Values.
Figure 12: Structural Similarity Index vs. Penetration Coef-
ficient with Small Epsilon Values.
[2] B. Sahiner, H.-P. Chan, N. Petrick, D. Wei, M. A. Helvie, D. D. Adler,
and M. M. Goodsitt, “Classification of mass and normal breast tissue:
a convolution neural network classifier with spatial domain and texture
images,” IEEE transactions on Medical Imaging, vol. 15, no. 5, pp.
598–610, 1996.
[3] I. Yilmaz and R. Masum, “Expansion of cyber attack data from
unbalanced datasets using generative techniques,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1912.04549, 2019.
[4] F. L. Lewis and D. Liu, Reinforcement learning and approximate
dynamic programming for feedback control. John Wiley & Sons, 2013,
vol. 17.
[5] Z. Wang and A. C. Bovik, “A universal image quality index,” IEEE
signal processing letters, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 81–84, 2002.
[6] Luminance. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Luminance
[7] Contrast. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contrast
[8] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[9] Database. [Online]. Available: http://marathon.csee.usf.edu/
Mammography/Database.html
[10] M. Abadi, P. Barham, J. Chen, Z. Chen, A. Davis, J. Dean, M. Devin,
S. Ghemawat, G. Irving, M. Isard et al., “Tensorflow: A system
for large-scale machine learning,” in 12th {USENIX} Symposium on
Operating Systems Design and Implementation ({OSDI} 16), 2016, pp.
265–283.
[11] C. Szegedy, W. Liu, Y. Jia, P. Sermanet, S. Reed, D. Anguelov, D. Erhan,
V. Vanhoucke, and A. Rabinovich, “Going deeper with convolutions,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, 2015, pp. 1–9.
[12] L. Deng, “The mnist database of handwritten digit images for machine
learning research [best of the web],” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine,
vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 141–142, 2012.
[13] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami, “The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings,” in
2016 IEEE European symposium on security and privacy (EuroS&P).
IEEE, 2016, pp. 372–387.
[14] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Deepfool: a simple
and accurate method to fool deep neural networks,” in Proceedings of
the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, 2016,
pp. 2574–2582.
[15] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, P. Frossard, and
S. Soatto, “Analysis of universal adversarial perturbations,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1705.09554, 2017.
[16] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune, “Deep neural networks are easily
fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images,” in
Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, 2015, pp. 427–436.
[17] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Adversarial examples are not easily detected:
Bypassing ten detection methods,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM
Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, 2017, pp. 3–14.
[18] A. Rozsa, E. M. Rudd, and T. E. Boult, “Adversarial diversity and
hard positive generation,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops, 2016, pp. 25–32.
[19] Z. Zhao, D. Dua, and S. Singh, “Generating natural adversarial exam-
ples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.11342, 2017.
[20] M. Baza, N. Lasla, M. Mahmoud, G. Srivastava, and M. Abdallah, “B-
ride: Ride sharing with privacy-preservation, trust and fair payment atop
public blockchain,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.09968, 2019.
[21] W. Al Amiri, M. Baza, M. Mahmoud, b. K. Banawan, W. Alasmary, and
K. Akkaya, “Privacy-preserving smart parking system using blockchain
and private information retrieval,” Proc. of the IEEE International
Conference on Smart Applications, Communications and Networking
(SmartNets 2019), 2020.
[22] M. Baza, M. Nabil, M. Ismail, M. Mahmoud, E. Serpedin, and M. Rah-
man, “Blockchain-based charging coordination mechanism for smart
grid energy storage units,” Proc. Of IEEE International Conference on
Blockchain, Atlanta, USA, July, 2019.
[23] M. Baza, M. Pazos-Revilla, M. Nabil, A. Sherif, M. Mahmoud, and
W. Alasmary, “Privacy-preserving and collusion-resistant charging co-
ordination schemes for smart grid,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.04666,
2019.
[24] M. Baza, M. Mahmoud, G. Srivastava, W. Alasmary, and M. Younis, “A
light blockchain-powered privacy-preserving organization scheme for
ride sharing services,” Proc. of the IEEE 91th Vehicular Technology
Conference (VTC-Spring), Antwerp, Belgium, May 2020.
[25] M. Baza et al., “Detecting sybil attacks using proofs of work and
location in vanets,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.05845, 2019.
[26] M. Baza, M. Nabil, M. Ismail, M. Mahmoud, E. Serpedin, and M. Rah-
man, “Blockchain-based privacy-preserving charging coordination
mechanism for energy storage units,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.02001,
2019.
[27] M. Baza, J. Baxter, N. Lasla, M. Mahmoud, M. Abdallah, and M. You-
nis, “Incentivized and secure blockchain-based firmware update and
dissemination for autonomous vehicles,” in Connected and Autonomous
Vehicles in Smart Cities. CRC press, 2020.
[28] M. Baza et al., “Blockchain-based distributed key management approach
tailored for smart grid,” in Combating Security Challenges in the Age
of Big Data. Springer, 2019.
[29] M. Baza, A. Salazar, M. Mahmoud, M. Abdallah, and K. Akkaya, “On
sharing models instead of data using mimic learning for smart health
applications,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.11210, 2019.
[30] W. Al Amiri, M. Baza, K. Banawan, M. Mahmoud, W. Alasmary, and
K. Akkaya, “Towards secure smart parking system using blockchain
technology,” Proc. of 17th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications &
Networking Conference (CCNC), Las vegas, USA, 2020.
[31] M. Baza et al., “An efficient distributed approach for key management in
microgrids,” Proc. of the Computer Engineering Conference (ICENCO),
Egypt, pp. 19–24, 2015.
[32] A. Shafee, M. Baza, D. A. Talbert, M. M. Fouda, M. Nabil, and
M. Mahmoud, “Mimic learning to generate a shareable network intru-
7sion detection model,” Proc. of the IEEE Consumer Communications &
Networking Conference,Las Vegas, USA, 2020.
